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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the arbitrability of disputes. It examines the recent
global trend of delimiting the role of public policy in determining matters
that should be subject to arbitration. The evaluation shows that the application
of doctrines of separability and kompetenz-kompentenz plays a vital role in
the delimitation process. However, notwithstanding the global trend to restrict
the role of public policy in determining arbitrability, some countries in Africa
still widely interpret public policy to revoke arbitral clause, stay arbitral
proceedings, or refuse enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. They justify
this approach on the basis that public policy is a means to protect national
economic interest against foreign manipulation or exploitation. Anchored on
Morgan’s theoretical approach, this article criticizes the excessive role of
public policy in determining the arbitrability of disputes in Africa. It calls for
a change to reflect the global trend through judicial activism and legislative
reform. Although protecting national economic interest is an important goal,
restricting matters that are arbitrable will not promote foreign investment.
Therefore, countries in Africa must fashion arbitration practices that reflect
their socio-economic background as well as contemporary arbitral trends
around the world.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Party autonomy includes the right of contractual parties to choose an
adjudicatory forum to determine rights and obligations arising from
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1 See Klára Drlièková, “Arbitrability and Public Interest in International Commercial
Arbitration” (2017) 17 ICLR 55, 58-60 for analysis on why some cases are
adjudged non-arbitrable.
2 Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and practice of International Commercial
Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell 1991), p.137.
3 The definition is based on classifications of arbitrability because there is no
single legal instrument that gives a succinct definition of the concept. Nyanchoka
notes that “There is no unified international concept of arbitrability”. He, however,
adopts the objective classification of arbitrability when he noted that “Loosely,
the concept has been defined in a limited manner to mean whether specific
clauses of disputes are barred from arbitration because of national legislation or
judicial authority”. See Alfred Nyanchoka, “The Scope of Arbitrability Under
Kenyan Law” (2013) 79 Arbitration 273, 273.
4 This is referred to as objective arbitrability. See Piero Bernardini, “The Problem
of Arbitrability in General” in Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico Di Pietro (eds),
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitration Awards:
The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2008) 503. See also, Natalja
Freimane, “Arbitrability: Problematic Issues of the Legal Term” (LLM, Riga
Graduate School of Law 2012) 22.
5 See Ilias Bantekas, “The Foundations of Arbitrability in International Commercial
Arbitration” (2008) 27 Australian Year Book 193, 193.
6 See for example, Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, K., “Public Policy and Arbitrability” in
Peter Sanders P (ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in
Arbitration, No 3 (Kluwer 1987) 177; Bernard Hanotiau & Olivier Caprasse,
their legal relationship. To this end, parties in most jurisdictions have
the autonomy to decide whether to determine their legal rights in a
national court or an arbitration tribunal. However, this right is usually
limited to private claims between individuals. Public claims are deemed
non-arbitrable because they involve matters considered to affect the
larger society.1 This limitation, which is decided by states according to
their social and economic policy, generally defines arbitrable matters.2
Arbitrability has two meanings.3 First, its sense as objective
arbitrability refers to the permission granted by the state for a dispute
to be settled by arbitration rather than courts.4 Second, it refers to the
sufficient jurisdiction of the arbitral panel to settle a dispute based on
the construction of the arbitration clause – subjective arbitrability.5
This article focuses on the first definition from an international
commercial arbitration perspective. It argues that the influence of public
policy should be limited in the determination of arbitrability in Africa,
especially in international commercial disputes.
Scholars have examined the scope of arbitrable matters in
international commercial arbitration.6 Early writers on this subject
support a wide interpretation of national public policy to deny an
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“Arbitrability, Due Process and Public Policy Under Article V of the New York
Convention: Belgian and French Perspectives” (2008) 25 Journal of International
Arbitration 721.
7 See Thomas Carbonneau & Andrew Sheldrick, “Tax Liability and Inarbitrability
in International Commercial Arbitration” (1992) 1 Journal of Transnational
Law and Public Policy 23, pp. 31-35.
8 See Rushmi Sethi, “International Arbitration: The Jurisdictional Award in Philip
Morris v Uruguay, and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards” (2016) 32
Arbitrational International 535, 540. But see Robert French, “Arbitration and
Public Policy” (2016) 24 Asian Pacific Law Review 1, 15 (He argues that public
policy should not only be about attracting business).
9 See, for example, Pierre Lalive, “Transnational (or Truly International) Public
Policy and International Arbitration” in Peter Sanders P (ed), Comparative
Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration, No 3 (Kluwer 1987), p.
258.
10 See, for example, Amazu Asouzu, International Commercial Arbitration and
African States: Practice, Participation and Institutional Development (Cambridge
University Press 2001).
11 Joseph Mante & Issaka Ndekugri, “Arbitrability in the Context of Ghana’s New
Arbitration Law” (2012) 15 International Arbitration Law Review 31; Joseph
Mante, “Arbitrability and Public Policy: An African perspective” (2016) 33
Arbitration International 1.
extended scope for arbitrable matters because, in their view, arbitrators
do not possess the competence and skill to handle matters that border
on public policy.7 However, recent comments on this subject admit the
need to narrowly interpret national public policy to permit a wider
scope of arbitrable matters in order to attract foreign investors and
create a “friendly arbitration country”.8 Some scholars even argue that
national public policies should be abandoned altogether for a
transnational public policy.9 However, there is a dearth of literature on
this subject from an African perspective. Few scholars focus on the
problems of arbitrability and when they do, they do not provide any
likely solution to the issue of public policy influence on arbitrability.10
They predominantly tried to comparatively show the disparity between
the influence of public policy on arbitrability in other jurisdictions and
Africa without suggesting ways to bridge the gap.11
This article seeks to fill the vacuum in the literature by
demonstrating how the interpretational approach in some countries,
recognized as desired arbitral seats, reflects a sound economic response
to globalization. It discusses the need for a similar approach for African
countries, especially Nigeria.
This article is divided into six sections. Section 2 examines the
amorphous nature of public policy and argues that the inability of
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12 See Mante (n 11). Indeed, it has been noted that “[t]he extent and nature of
judicial intervention in the arbitral process has been an intense tussle between
the contractual and jurisdictional theories of arbitration and would continue to
be”. See Asouzu (n 10) 176.
13 Richardson v Mellish [1824] 2 Bing 229. See analysis of the doctrine of public
policy in Bradon Kain & Douglas Yoshida, “The Doctrine of Public Policy in
Canadian Contract Law” [2007] Annual Review of Civil Litigation 1, 2-5
<www.mccarthy.ca/pubs/The_Doctrine_of_Public_ Policy_in_Canadian_
Contract_Law.pdf> accessed on 18 August 2018.
courts and scholars to universally define this term is a reason for its
divergent influence on arbitrability. Section 3 notes that notwith-
standing the amorphous nature of public policy, most countries,
especially developed ones, have limited public policy influence in the
determination of arbitral disputes. Section 4 shows a contrary approach
in some African countries. Through the analysis of case studies in
Nigeria, Uganda, and Ghana, this section demonstrates how some
African countries restrict matters that are arbitrable because of their
wide interpretation of public policy. It subjects these cases to theoretical
analysis and argues that they fail to distinguish between those rights
that naturally flow from one person’s interaction with another and
those that are imposed by the state in furtherance of the collective
interest. Section 5 argues for a change in approach from nationalistic
protectionism to economic and investment promotion. If African
countries will become an arbitration hub, they must fashion arbitration
practices that reflect their socio-economic backgrounds, as well as
contemporary global arbitral trends. Section 6 concludes that, given
the amorphous nature of public policy, judicial activism is the most
potent tool by which to enhance the prospect of a global convergence
on arbitrability.
2.  DETERMINING ARBITRABILITY
The determination of matters that are arbitrable is usually
controversial.12 This controversy arises from the role that public policy
plays in determining arbitrability. Public policy has not lent itself to
easy definition, partly because it has no source of reference, and because
it changes from time to time. In fact, Burrough J. says it is “a very
unruly horse, and once you get astride it, you never know where it will
carry you”.13 Though difficult to define, public policy is usually expressed
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14 Mante (n 11) 16.
15 For further analysis, see Homayoon Arfazadeh, “Arbitrability under the New
York Convention: The Lex Fori Revisited” (2001) 17 Arbitration International
73.
16 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/72 (11 December 1985)
amended in 2006 [the Model Law].
17 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (10
June 1958) 330 UNTS 38 (New York Convention).
18 See also Article 34(2) (b) of the Model Law.
in four categories – mandatory law, fundamental principles of law, public
order, or good morals and national interest.14 Notwithstanding this
classification, the definition of public policy is yet to be globally agreed
upon. Therefore, to determine matters that are arbitrable, there is no
universally accepted distinction between public and private matters –
an unpleasant situation in international commercial arbitration. This
difficult distinction between private and public matters is exacerbated
by two international commercial arbitration instruments which neither
define public policy nor matters that are arbitrable.15
Article 1(5) of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration provides:
“[t]his Law shall not affect any other law of this State by virtue of
which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration or may be
submitted to arbitration only according to provisions other than those
of this Law”.16 In effect, it permits states to decide issues of arbitrability
and the role that public policy plays in it. Also, article V(2)(a) and
V(2)(b) of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards leaves the yardstick for determining public
policy to each national court.17 Paragraph V(2)(a) provides that states
could refuse enforcement on an award because it is non-arbitrable,
while paragraph V(2)(b) provides that awards may not be generally
recognized if they are against national public policy.18 In effect, matters
that fall within the realm of public policy are, by nature, undefined. As
well, instruments that regulate arbitration practice do not limit public
policy matters. Therefore, the definition and application of public policy
depend largely on courts’ creativity.
3.  RECENT TRENDS IN ARBITRABILITY
Over the years, most jurisdictions, especially developed countries that
are considered as desired seats of arbitration, have widened the scope
2019 SEPARATING THE WHEAT FROM THE CHAFF 109
19 See Queen Mary University of London & White & Case LLP, “2018 International
Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration”<http://
arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2018-International-Arbitration-
Survey – The-Evolution-of-International-Arbitration-(2).PDF> accessed on 18
August 2018.The survey listed London, Paris, Singapore, Hong Kong and Geneva
as the top five arbitration seats in the world.
20 See Karim Youssef, “The Death of Inarbitrability”, in Loukas Mistelis & Stavros
Brekoulakis (eds), Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspective
(Kluwer 2009), p.57.
21 See Freimane (n 4), p.16.
22 105 S Ct 3346 (1985). It positively answered the question of whether a properly
constituted arbitral body pursuant to a valid arbitration clause under the auspices
of the New York Convention could adjudicate matters related to competition
and antitrust law.
23 ibid 639. The court stated that “We conclude that concerns of international
comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability
in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement,
even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context”. See also Christoph Liebscher, “Arbitration of Antitrust Disputes” in
General’ in Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico Di Pietro (eds), Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitration Awards: The New York
Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2008), p.523.
24 Belize Bank Ltd v Gov’t of Belize 191 F Supp 3d 26, 32, 39 (DDC 2016).
25 [2003] 3 SCR 416, 419.
of arbitrable matters.19 In other words, notwithstanding the absence
of a universal definition of public policy, they have restricted the influence
of public policy in determining arbitrability.20 The restriction becomes
necessary to encourage parties to choose these countries as seats of
arbitration and to promote foreign investment.21 In effect, globalization
of international trade has necessitated considerable expansion of the
scope of arbitrable matters in international commercial arbitration.
Brief examples of how courts in some countries have restricted public
policy influence on arbitrability will illustrate this point.
The United States’ Supreme Court in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc22 held that courts should not “subordinate domestic
notions of arbitrability to the international policy favouring commercial
arbitration”.23 Therefore, the “public policy defence is to be construed
narrowly for application only where enforcement would violate the
[United States’] most basic notions of morality and justice.”24 Similarly,
Canada’s Supreme Court decision in Beals v Saldanha25 narrowly applied
public policy to only acts that offend Canadian principles of justice
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26 See also the Ontario court decision in Schreter v Gasmac, Inc (1992) 7 OR 3d
608, 621.
27 Michael Mustill, Baron Mustill & Stewart Boyd, Commercial Arbitartion (2nd ed,
Butterworths 1989) 149. Also, section 1030 of the German Civil Code provides
that “[a]ny claim involving an economic interest can be the subject of an arbitration
agreement. An arbitration agreement concerning claims not involving an
economic interest shall have legal effect to the extent that the parties are
entitled to conclude a settlement on the issue in dispute.”
28 Et Plus SA v Welter [2006] Lloyd’s Rep 251, 264; Fulham Football Club (1987)
Ltd v Richards (2011) EWCA Civ 855, para 78. (English Ct. App.). See also
Katarzyna Sadrak, “Arbitration Agreements and Actions for Antitrust Damages
after the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide Judgment” (2017) 16 Yearbook of Anti-trust
and Regulation Studies 77. He argues that anti-competition contracts are
enforceable in the European Union.
29 Arbitration Act 1996, sch 1, s 34(6) (NZ).
30 AJU v AJT [2011]4 SLR 739; PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank
SA [2007] 1 SLR(R)597. See also Matthew Shaw, “Singapore Court of Appeal:
When are Company Disputes Arbitrable?” (International Arbitration Newsletter,
17 December 2017) <https://dlapiper.com/en/canada/insights/publications/
2015/12/international-arbitration-newsletter-q4-2015/singapore-court-of-
appeal/> accessed on 15 April 2019. Also, Article 177 of the Swiss Private
International Law Act (Act), regarding international arbitration, provides that
“any dispute of financial interest may be subject of an arbitration.” Subsection
2 provides that “A state, or an enterprise held by, or an organization controlled
by a state, which is party to an arbitration agreement, cannot invoke its own law
in order to contest its capacity to arbitrate or the arbitrability of a dispute
covered by the arbitration agreement”.
31 For more details, see generally Mistelis & Brekoulakis (n 20); Freimane, (n 4).
See also George Bermann, (ed), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards: The Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National
Courts, vol 23 (Springer International 2017), pp. 55-58.
and fairness in a fundamental way.26 Also, under English law, all disputes
concerning legal rights which can be the subject of an award are
arbitrable.27 Therefore, English courts have held that competition or
anti-trust claims that contain a public element are arbitrable.28 The
New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996 also provides that an award is
contrary to public policy only if “[a] breach of the rules of natural
justice occurred – (i) during the arbitral proceedings; or (ii) in
connection with the making of the award.”29 Other countries like
Singapore,30 that had previously widely interpreted public policy, now
adopt a narrow approach.31 Also, a common trend in Europe, for
instance, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
and Finland, is that all disputes capable of private settlement are
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32 See Tony Cole et al, Legal Instrument and Practice of Arbitration in the EU, Study
for the Juri Committee (Brussels, European Union 2014) 40-42 < http://
e u r o p a r l . e u r o p a . e u / R e g D a t a / e t u d e s / S T U D / 2 0 1 5 / 5 0 9 9 8 8 /
IPOL_STU(2015)509988_EN.pdf> accessed on 18 August 2018. See also
Antoine Kirry, “Arbitrability: Current Trends in Europe” (1996) 12 Arbitration
International, pp. 373, 374-379.
33 [2016] FCA 1164. See also Nicola v Ideal Image Development Corporation
Incorporated [2009] FCA 1177. It has generally been noted that “…the approach
of Australian courts to the issue of arbitrability is far from settled. However, on
balance, it may be concluded that a slight bias exists in favour of the arbitrability
of most disputes, subject to there not being a sufficient element of legitimate
public interest in the subject matter”. See Robert Kovacs, “A Transnational
Approach to the Arbitrability of Insolvency Proceedings in International
Arbitration” [2012] International Insolvency Institute 1, 62 < https://
iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/transnationalapproachtothearbitrability
ofinsolvencyproceedingsininternationalarbitration.pdf> accessed on 20 March
2019.
34 Indeed, courts in these continents have extended arbitrable matters to family
disputes which have traditionally been non-arbitrable. See Wendy Kennett,
“It’s Arbitration, But Not as We Know It: Reflections on Family Law Dispute
arbitrable.32 Indeed, the Australian Federal Court decision in WDR
Delaware Corporation v Hydrox Holdings Pty Ltd extended arbitrable
issues to winding-up proceedings involving contractual disputes
between sole shareholders.33 In this case, the court acknowledges that
there is no public interest in such contractual disputes, and hence
bifurcated the contract disputes between shareholders and the general
winding-up proceedings.
In effect, contractual disputes including tax, bankruptcy, family,
intellectual property, are increasingly arbitrable in most developed
countries because courts separate private contracts from matters that
hitherto had been confined to the public policy realm. This approach
promotes party autonomy and empowers arbitral tribunals to decide
on complex issues. It also contributes to the recognition of some
countries as desired seats of arbitration, which ultimately may increase
economic growth and capital flow because parties would prefer these
countries as seats of arbitration and/or enforcement of award.
4.  DIVERGENT APPROACHES IN SOME
AFRICAN COUNTRIES
Notwithstanding that the role of public policy has waned in most
jurisdictions in Europe, Asia, and America,34 some countries in Africa
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Resolution” (2016) 30 International Journal of Law, Policy and The Family 1;
Adesina Bello, “Arbitration as a Template for Resolving Family Disputes” (2018)
84 Arbitration 239.
35 It should be noted that some countries outside the African continent still widely
interpret public policy. An example is India, see Arjit Oswal & Balaji Sai Krishnan,
“Public Policy as a Ground to Set Aside Arbitral Award in India” (2016) 32
Arbitration International 651.
36 Mante & Ndekugri, (n 11) 10, 28. For example, they argue that Ghanaian law
on arbitrability may be one of the most restrictive legal systems on arbitrability
in the world.
37 Alan Rycroft, “The Development of Concept of Arbitrability – An International
Comparison” (LLM, University of Cape Town 2016) 4.
38 Andrew Armfelt, “Avoiding the Arbitration Trap” Financial Times (London, 27
October 1992) 20, quoted in Asouzu (n 10), p. 429.
39 Beata Kozubovska, “Trends in Arbitrability” (2014) 1 Institute of Advanced
Legal Studies Student Law Review 22, 23
40 Mistelis & Brekoulakis, (n 20) 6.
41 ibid.
42 Ibid.
still widely interpret public policy to restrict matters that are arbitrable.35
Indeed, it has been noted that “[f]or many developing countries the
traditional view that public policy issues are not arbitrable still holds
sway”.36 Rycroft further notes that “[t]he relevance of public policy for
the determination of arbitrability has declined in Europe and America
and the majority of the cases involving public policy are now deemed
arbitrable. On the contrary, public policy remains of great significance
in Africa”.37 It is, therefore, no gainsaying that African countries rely on
the public policy defence to revoke arbitral clause, stay arbitral
proceedings, or refuse enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. This
trend stems from the distrust of arbitration tribunals, as well as national
courts’ protectionist approach.38 Historically, most developing countries
distrust arbitration as an avenue to settle public claims because they
are regarded as complicated for arbitrators.39 The argument is that
allowing parties to arbitrate on public claims goes against the notion
of sovereign dignity.40 Developing countries, therefore, fear that this
unfettered choice will favour parties from industrialized countries
because they can unilaterally influence an agreement that is against
the developing country’s public policy.41 Indeed, it has been noted that
“this type of private justice [arbitration] inevitably ignores the legitimate
regulatory interests of concerned states”.42
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43 Nigerian cases suggest that admiralty disputes are not arbitrable. See Owners
of the M V Lupex v Nigeria Overseas Chartering and Shipping Limited [1993-
1995] NSCC 182; Onward Enterprises Limited v Matrix [2010] 2 NWLR [Pt
1179] 153.
44 Indeed, it has been noted that arbitrability is more vexed in developing countries.
See Fiona Campbell, “Arbitrability of Disputes: Issues of Arbitrability Public
Policy in the UAE” (Lexology, 28 May 2014) 2 <http://lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=b4e60582-f6aa-435b-8ef0-550b0a9298ce > accessed on 18
August 2018; Muhammed Akanbi, “Contending Without Being Contentious:
Arbitration, Arbitrators and Arbitrability” (152nd Inaugural Lecture, University
of Ilorin,  13 November 2014) <https://unilorin.edu.ng/UIL/152.pdf>
accessed on 18 August 2018; Adewale Olawoyin, “Safeguarding Arbitral
Integrity in Nigeria: Potential conflict between Legislative Policies and Foreign
Arbitration clauses in Bills of Lading” (2006) 17 The American Review of
International Arbitration 239; Chuka Obiozor, “Does an Arbitration clause or
Agreement oust the Jurisdiction of the Courts? A Review of the case of the MV
Panormos Bay v Olam (NIG) PLC” (2010) 6 Nigerian Bar Journal 165; Ademola
Taiwo, “The Effect of Section 20 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act No 59 of
1991 on International Arbitration Clauses” (2006) 1 University of Ibadan Law
Journal 1.
45 See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, “The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third
World Viewpoint” (1989) 6 Journal of International Arbitration 7, 15-16.
46 See for example, Chinedum Umeche, “Arbitrability of tax disputes in Nigeria”
(2017) 33 Arbitration International 1, 4.
47 See generally, Andrew Chukwuemerie, “Arbitration and Human Rights in Africa”
(2007) 7 African Human Rights Journal, p. 103.
Arbitrability has, therefore, generated commentaries from scholars
in Africa. Debate on arbitrability of human rights, admiralty,43
intellectual property, agreement between shareholders and companies,
and winding-up disputes are rife in developing countries.44 The majority
view is that these subject matters should not be arbitrable. The
argument is that developing countries should not decrease the range
of non-arbitrable matters because of the financial power foreign
investors hold.45 In effect, they support the present broad interpretation
of public policy to protect national interests in Africa. However, not all
scholars subscribe to this approach.46 One of these proposes that human
rights claims should be arbitrable in Africa.47 This article takes the same
view regarding the arbitrability of disputes. It suggests ways to achieve
a wider range of arbitrable disputes in Africa.
I argue that the protectionist approach advanced by scholars and
national courts has negative effects on the growth of arbitration and
economy in Africa because parties would not choose African countries
as the seat of their arbitration. This is because the restrictive and
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48 Indeed, it has been noted that “business activity is facilitated by legal certainty…
The content of any particular law can only be understood in a meaningful way if its
application to particular circumstances can be predicted”. See Iain MacNeil,
“Uncertainty in Commercial Law” (2009) 13 The Edinburgh Law Review, pp. 68, 69.
49 Okereife agrees with this proposition. See Andrew Okekeifere, “Public Policy
and Arbitrability Under the Uncitral Model Law” (1999) 2 International
Arbitration Law Review, pp. 70, 73.
50 The Liberia Commercial Code Ch 7 (2010) art 7.2 (3) (“non-arbitrable matters”
include those “involving the determination of liability for the commission of a
crime, a tort, environmental pollution or matters relating to the public interest
or the Constitution”).
51 Botswana Arbitration Act,1959, s 7.
52 Tunisian Arbitration Code (Law No 93-42 of 26 April 1993), art 7(1).
53 Zambia’s Arbitration Act [No19 of 2000], s 6 (2) (a).
54 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010 (Act 978) (the Act applies to all matters
except those that relate to (a) the national or public interest; (b) the environment;
(c) the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution; or (d) any other
matter that by law cannot be settled by an alternative dispute resolution
method).
55 Section 35 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Cap A18, Laws of the Federation
of Nigeria 2004 merely provides that the Act will not apply to disputes that
may not be submitted to arbitration.
uncertain influence of public policy in the determination of arbitrable
matters means that parties will be unsure of matters that may be subject
to arbitration.48 Also, parties in developed countries will be unwilling
to enter into an arbitration agreement with their counterparts in Africa
because, in the event of enforcement in Africa, an award may be set
aside as it may be subject to an adverse interpretation of public policy.
This state of affairs holds back the development of arbitration in Africa.49
Brief examples of how national statutes and case law in Africa have
“protectively” guided arbitrable matters through public policy illustrate
this point.
Section 4(2) of the Zimbabwe Arbitration Act 1996 lists matters
that are not arbitrable in Zimbabwe. They include matters relating to
public policy, although the criteria for determining public policy are
not set out. The list also includes matters relating to crime, marriage,
and consumer contracts. Although the last two matters may be referred
to arbitration by leave of the court, the first two matters (public policy
and crime) permit courts to widely interpret public policy. Other African
countries with similar arbitration statutes include Liberia,50 Botswana,51
Tunisia,52 Zambia,53 and Ghana.54
However, statutes in countries like Nigeria and Kenya do not
stipulate non-arbitrable matters.55 In effect, case law independently
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56 See Kano State Urban Development Board v. Fanz Construction CO [1990] 4NWLR
(Pt 142).
57 Christ for all Nations v Appollo Insurance Co Ltd [2002] 2 EA 366.
58 This article identifies the need for a comprehensive comparative study of cases
relating to arbitrability in Africa. The choice of countries examined in this article
is influenced by recent court decisions and geographical considerations.
59 Unreported Judgment CA/A/208/2012 delivered on 31 August 2016.
determines arbitrability in these countries. The Supreme Court of
Nigeria stated that matters that are not arbitrable in Nigeria include
indictment for an offence of a public nature; disputes arising from an
illegal contract, gaming and wagering; disputes leading to a change of
status such as divorce petition, bankruptcy proceedings, and winding
up a company; and any arbitral agreement that empowers the arbitrator
to give a decision in property.56 Also, in Kenya, non-arbitrable matters
have been held to include contracts “inconsistent with the constitution
or other laws of Kenya, whether written or unwritten; or inimical to
the national interest of Kenya; or contrary to justice and morality”.57
The determination of arbitrability through case law particularly
generates peculiar difficulties because it allows the courts to exercise
uncircumscribed discretion. This section examines cases where courts
in Africa interpreted arbitrability, especially through the public policy
lens. For reason of space, this article analyses cases in Nigeria, Uganda,
and Ghana. Although the case studies do not represent the state of
things in all African countries, they indicate a trend in Africa.58
4.1 Nigeria
In Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Ltd v Federal Inland Revenue
Service and Anor, decided in 2016,59 the appellants (or contractors)
entered into a production sharing contract (PSC) with the Nigerian
State Oil Company (NNPC) in respect of Deep Offshore Mining Lease
(OML) 118. By the PSC, any crude oil found is allocated to the parties
in accordance with the “lifting allocation” on the basis of “Royalty
Oil”, “Cost Oil”, “Tax Oil”, and “Profit Oil”, respectively. The PSC also
provided that the contractors shall have the sole right and responsibility
to compute the lifting allocation. Subsequently, the contractors alleged
that NNPC had breached the terms of the PSC by lifting crude oil in
excess of its allotted entitlements. The contractors also alleged that
their tax obligations arising under the PSC, contained in the tax returns
filed by NNPC with the Nigerian tax authority, Federal Inland Revenue
116 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 10: 1: 2019
60 See section 251 of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution. The court also relied on
section 35 of the Nigeria’s Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Cap A18, Laws of
the Federation of Nigeria 2004 which provides that the Act “…shall not affect
any other law by virtue of which certain disputes – (a) may not be submitted to
arbitrations; (b) may be submitted to arbitration only in accordance with the
Service (FIRS), were allegedly grossly overstated, and had led to
overpayment of tax. Accordingly, and in compliance with the dispute
resolution provisions of the  PSC, the contractors commenced arbitration
proceedings against NNPC, seeking for declarations and reliefs, inter
alia, that: under the PSC, the contractors were entitled to compute
and allocate tax oil on the basis of their prepared returns under the
Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) Act, and that NNPC should be restrained
from submitting tax returns and making tax  payments that are
inconsistent with the contractor’s returns.
Upon receiving information of the arbitration, the Nigerian Federal
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), an agency charged with the statutory
functions and powers to assess, collect, and account for taxes under
the various tax legislations in Nigeria, took out an Originating Summons
at the Federal High Court, Abuja (Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory),
citing both the contractors and NNPC as defendants. It sought
declarations, inter alia, that the contractor’s claims before the arbitral
tribunal is not arbitrable, as the determination of such claim will
impinge on FIRS’ statutory powers, and that the reference of claims
that touch on taxation, (a subject matter exclusively reserved for the
Federal High Court under Section 251(1) of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999) is unconstitutional, null and void.
The Federal High Court upheld the position of FIRS and terminated
the arbitration proceedings. Dissatisfied, the contractors appealed to
the Court of Appeal.
There, they argued that the claims before the arbitral tribunal are
purely contractual disputes arising under the parties’ contract (the PSC),
and are, therefore, arbitrable. They further contended that in any event,
the issues relating to computation of Petroleum Profit Tax were only
ancillary reliefs in the course of the determination of the private
contractual rights of the parties under the PSC. The Court of Appeal
rejected this submission. The Court held that a production sharing
contract that includes clauses relating to tax issues are not arbitrable
because the Federal High Court of Nigeria exclusively adjudicates tax
disputes.60 This decision affirmed the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision
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provision of that or another law”. The debate whether tax issues are arbitrable
is outside the scope of this article. However, for an analysis, see Thomas
Carbonneau & Andrew Sheldrick, “Tax Liability and Inarbitrability in
International Commercial Arbitration” (1992) 23 J Transnational Law & Policy
1.
61 [2014] LPELR-23144 (CA); See also Nigerian Agip Exploration Ltd v NNPC
[2014] 6 CLRN 150.
62 Paul Obo Idornigie, “Nigerian Telecommunications Plc. v Pentascope International
B V Private Ltd; Separability Circumscribed by Arbitrability” (2005) 71
Arbitration 372.
63 Section 6(5) of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution. Courts include the Supreme
Court of Nigeria, the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court, the High Court
of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, a High Court of a State, the Sharia Court
of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, a Sharia Court of Appeal of a
State, the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, a
Customary Court of Appeal of a State. See Sunday Ufombo v Wosu Ahuchaogu
& ors (2003) 6 SCM 189. See also Ademola Gbamgbose, “Towards a Suitable
Domestic Arbitration Practice in Nigeria” (DPHIL, University of Warwick School
of Law 2016), p.104.
in Statoil (Nigeria) Limited and Anor v Federal Inland Revenue Service,61
that contracts arising out of tax matters are not arbitrable in Nigeria.
These decisions elicit a question: are all disputes over which the
Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction non-arbitrable in Nigeria?
A commentator agrees with the court that the answer is in the positive.62
The effect of this interpretation is that all matters under section 251(1)
including energy, oil, and gas, telecommunication, aviation, bankruptcy
and insolvency disputes, are inarbitrable. However, the opening
paragraph of section 251(1) of the Nigerian Constitution betrays this
interpretation. Section 251(1) states: “[n]otwithstanding anything to
the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such
other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National
Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of any other court in civil matters”.
An arbitral tribunal is not a court in Nigeria.63 Therefore, section
251(1) of the Constitution cannot be an ouster clause for arbitrable
matters. Indeed, the United States’ Mitsubishi case noted that in
international commercial arbitration, courts ought to exercise a parallel
jurisdiction to arbitration tribunals. Therefore, general ouster clauses
like 251 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution should not determine
arbitrable matters because it regulates court qua court jurisdiction.
The Australian Courts rejected this general ouster clause in Rinehart v
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64 (2012) 95 NSWLR 221.
65 (1990) 169 CLR 332.
66 Chinedum Umeche (n 46) 4.
67 See for example, AED Oil Limited v Puffin FPSO Limited [2009] VSC 534; Petrola
Hellas v The Greek State (Award) (1978) 11 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration
105;  Lauren Waveney Brazier, “The Arbitrability of Investor-State Taxation
Disputes in International Commercial Arbitration” (LLM, University of
Wellington 2013); Therese Jansson, “Arbitrability Regarding Patent Law – An
International Study” (LLM, Lund University 2010).
68 See Philip Landolt, “The Inconvenience of Principle: Separability and
Kompetenz-Kompetenz” (2013) 30 Journal of International Arbitration, pp.
511-530.
69 Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment Act), 2007.
Walker64 and Tanning Research Laboratories Inc. v O’Brien65 where they
held that blanket ouster generalization cannot bar matters that are
arbitrable.
A commentator justified the Nigerian Courts’ position on the ground
that tax disputes are generally contrary to public policy and are,
therefore, non-arbitrable.66 This study argues otherwise. Contract
disputes arising out of tax issues must be severable from general
revenue or tax issues.67 The principle of “contract separability” should
be applied to all issues subject to international commercial arbitration.68
On a cursory interpretation of the facts of the case, the issue is purely
contractual – it is a case of NNPC’s unilateral preparation of tax returns,
contrary to the PSC. It is not a case of an aggrieved person against tax
assessment or demand notice issued by FIRS under the FIRS Act. Thus,
the contractor is not aggrieved by the decision of FIRS; it is contesting
NNPC’s breach of contract. If the contractor was aggrieved by FIRS’
tax computation, it would have triggered the provisions of paragraph
13(1) and 17(1) of the 5th Schedule to the FIRS (Establishment) Act
which provides that an aggrieved person can submit tax assessment
disputes to a Tax Administration Tribunal, and if dissatisfied with the
Tribunal’s decision, to the Federal High Court.69
Therefore, flowing from the interpretation of the FIRS
(Establishment) Act above, the Court of Appeal’s invocation of Federal
High Court’s Jurisdiction is premature. This is because sections 26 and
27 of the FIRS Act provide that tax assessment is based on the tax
returns filed by individuals or companies. If the return does not meet
FIRS’ requirements, FIRS can ask for a fuller and comprehensive tax
return to assess the payable tax. It is the dispute arising from the
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70 [2018] EWCA Civ 838. See also Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC, p.42.
71 Indeed, the Australian Court in TLC Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) v Castel
Electronics Pty Ltd (2014) 232 FCR 361 383-384 advises that: “… it is not
only appropriate, but essential, to pay due regard to the reasoned decisions of
other countries where their laws are either based on, or take their content
from, international conventions or instruments such as the New York Convention
and the Model Law”.
72 Taofeek Alatise, “Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration: Protecting the
Interests of Third-Parties to Arbitration in Nigeria” (2018) 9 Afe Babalola
University Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 220, 241.
73 Suit No FHC/ABJ/CS/36/2005 delivered on 25 May 2005.
74 Cap C20 Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004.
assessment that qualifies as a tax dispute which must be submitted to
Tax Appeal Tribunal and/or Federal High Court.
In effect, there is no nexus between the question of who is to file
tax returns under the PSC and assessment of tax returns under the
FIRS Act. Had the Court of Appeal separated these two issues, maybe
it would have come to a different conclusion. Although the English
Court in RBRG Trading v Sinocore International held that the degree of
connection between the claim and the public issue is an important
consideration in determining arbitrable matters,70 in the Shell case
discussed, there was no public element that arises from the dispute as
to who should file tax returns under the production sharing contract.
While acknowledging that English authorities are only persuasive to
Nigerian courts, the latter can take a cue from this English decision.71
This is because “[t]he present unduly and restrictive approach of
[Nigerian] courts is completely at odds, and does not reflect the growing
judicial pragmatism of their counterparts in developed jurisdictions”.72
Similarly, in Nigerian Telecommunications Plc v Pentascope
International BV Private Ltd,73 the Nigerian High Court held that where
a contract is tainted with illegality, the whole contract (container
contract and arbitration agreement) is intertwined with public policy;
hence, the dispute is non-arbitrable. In this case, the company, without
being incorporated in Nigeria as mandated by section 54(1) of the
Companies and Allied Matters Act,74 entered into a contract, which was
the subject matter of dispute. The Plaintiff argued that the contract,
together with the arbitration agreement, is void for non-compliance
with the Companies and Allied Matters Act. The Plaintiff also argued
that once the validity of a contract is raised, the court must decide this
issue, and not refer it to arbitration. The Court agreed with these
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75 This is contrary to the principle of implied consent to arbitrate. See Alan Scott
Rau, “Everything You Really Need to Know About ‘Separability’ in Seventeen
Simple Propositions” (2003) 14 American Review of International Arbitration
1, 34-35 (“The thrust of the doctrine of ‘separability,’ then, is to recognize the
probable competence of the arbitrators, by presuming that they have been
entrusted by the parties with the power to make a virtually non-reviewable
decision on the issue of validity”). See also Richard Reuben, “First Options,
Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to
Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions” (2003) 56 S M U L Rev 819;
Francis Okanigbuan Jr, “Revisiting the Separability Doctrine and Parties’ Rights
to Litigation in Commercial Transactions” (2015) 26 International Company
and Commercial Law Review, p.255.
76 See Peter Gillies, “Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitration Awards
– the New York Convention” (2004) 9 International Trade and Business Law
Review, pp.19, 23-25.
77 Dell Computer Corp v Union des Consommateurs [2007] 2 SCR 801.
78 Paul Obo Idornigie (n 62) 377. He notes that “…if the contract is in law not
subsisting, even if the principle of separability is applied the principle cannot
stand in vacuum as it requires a platform to treat the liability arising from the
breach of the underlying contract to which the terms of the contract relate.
What the principle of separability states is that the arbitration clause is
independent of the other terms of contract. It does not mean it is independent
of the contract… the principle of separability is circumscribed by the principle
of arbitrability”.
arguments and declined the application to stay proceedings pending
arbitration.
Again, I disagree with the Plaintiff ’s argument and the court’s
position. This is because, without evidence, the court presumed that
the contract is shrewd with illegality.75 The determination of illegality
in a contractual dispute, is at best, a matter of mixed law and fact,
which ought to be left for the arbitral tribunal to decide.76 Indeed, the
Canadian Supreme Court held that where the issue to be decided in a
container contract is a matter of a mixed question of law and fact, the
container contract, together with the arbitration agreement – which is
treated separately—ought to be referred to arbitration.77 This approach
supports a pro-arbitration policy where the container contract and
arbitration agreement are treated separately.
However, Idornigie argues that where public policy is in issue, the
doctrine of separability must give way.78 He argues that this is expedient
and cost-saving because the issue of arbitrability and legality of the
container contract is resolved in only one forum – the court. However,
this argument neglects the fundamental principle upon which an arbitral
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79 Idornigie’s argument assumes that the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to rule on
illegality. This position is incorrect, courts have upheld arbitral panels’ ruling on
illegality, if they are satisfied that the arbitral panel applied the law to the facts
and there is no miscarriage of justice. The English court in Fiona Trust & Holding
Corp v Privalov [2007] Lloyd’s Rep 267 held that fraud and corruption can be
decided by the arbitral tribunal; see also the United States’ decision in Meadows
Indemnity Co v Baccala & Shop Insurance Services, 760 F Supp 1036 (1991)
where it was held that issues of fraud are arbitrable. The French court in Cour
d’ Appeal de Paris, 29 March 1991 and Ganz and Others v Soc Nationale des
Chemins de fer Tunisiens REY ARB [1991] 478 arrived at a similar decision.
80 Harry Edwards, “Advantages of Arbitration over Litigation: Reflections of a
Judge” (1983) Proceedings of the 35th Meeting of the National Academy of
Arbitrators 16, 23.
81 586 US 139 S Ct. 524 (2019).
82 Emilia Onyema, “The doctrine of Separability under Nigerian Law” (2009)1
Apojee Journal of Business, Property and Constitutional Law, pp.65, 74.
83 See for example, Article 1458 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure (1981)
which provides that “Whenever a dispute submitted to an arbitral tribunal by
virtue of an arbitration agreement is brought before the court of the state, such
court shall decline jurisdiction. If the arbitral tribunal has not yet been seized of
the matter, the court should also decline jurisdiction unless the arbitration
agreement is manifestly null”. See also Société Nationale Algerienne pour la
Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation
des Hydrocarbures v Distrigas Corporation 80 BR 606, 612 (1987) (The US
Court held that “allowing an arbitration clause to be automatically invalidated
along with the principal agreement would be akin to destroying precisely what
agreement is based – party autonomy. It is also against the principle of
kompetenz-kompetenz because it assumes that an arbitrator has no
competence to rule on its own jurisdiction.79 Furthermore, compared
to courts, one of the advantages of arbitration is its speed. Therefore,
the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal can be taken at the tribunal’s
preliminary hearing and decided expeditiously.80 Indeed, the argument
that it is expedient for courts to determine arbitrability was rejected in
the recent decision of the US Supreme Court in Henry Schein, Inc. v.
Archer & White Sales, Inc.81 The Supreme court held that where a Court
thinks that it is groundless to refer issues of arbitrability to an
arbitration panel, the court must still respect parties’ wish.
Similar to Idornigie position, Onyema noted that “…in the context
of Nigerian law where the subject matter of the underlying contract is
not arbitrable, then both the main contract and arbitration agreement
contained in it will be void for illegality or on the grounds of public
policy”.82 This position opposes recent global contemporary
developments in arbitration.83 Indeed, it has been noted that “in
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the parties had sought to create as a dispute resolution device”); Twi Lite
International Inc v Anam Pacific Corp 1996 WL637843 (ND Cal).
84 1 Loukas Mistelis, “Legal Issues Arising out of Disputes Involving Fraud, Bribery,
Corruption and Other Illegality and Illicitness Issues” in Emmanuel Gaillard &
Domenico Di Pietro (eds), Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and
International Arbitration Awards: The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron
May 2008) 573, 585. See also Pierre Mayer, “Effect of International Public
Policy in International Arbitration?” in Loukas Mistelis & Julian Lew (eds),
Pervasive Problems in international Arbitration (Kluwer 2006), p.61.
85 See Alan Rycroft (n 37) 22. See also John Pottow, Jacob Brege & Tara Hawley, “A
Presumptively Better Approach to Arbitrability” (2013) 53 The Canadian
Business Law Journal 165.
86 [1926] AC 497.
87 [1942] App Cas 356; see also Harbour Assurance Co. Ltd. v Kansa General
International Insurance Co. Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 455.
88 See also United States’ decisions in Prima Paint Corp v Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Corporation 388 U S 395 (1967) (holding that the dispute
must be referred to arbitration unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause
itself); Buckeye Check Cashing Inc v Cardegna 126 S Ct 1204 (2006) (“Regardless
of whether it is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of a
contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause within it, must
go to the arbitrator, not the court”). See Kirsten Weisenberger, “From Hostility
to Harmony: Buckeye Marks A Mile-stone in the Acceptance of Arbitration in
American Jurisprudence” (2005) 16 American Review of International Arbitration
551, 558; John Pottow, Jacob Brege, & Tara J Hawley, “A Presumptive Better
conjunction with the acceptance of the doctrine of separability it has
become increasingly accepted that allegations of the illegality of the
main contract do not automatically lead to the non-arbitrability of the
dispute”.84
If Onyema’s position is correct, then, upon termination or
completion of a contract, the arbitration agreement will naturally end
with the contract. This article demonstrates that an arbitration
agreement must survive the contract because it is the basis upon which
claims or counterclaims arising from the contract are settled.85 Onyema’s
position reflects the English court’s decision in Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue
Steamship Co Ltd decided in 1926.86 The English court of appeal held
that frustration of a contract ends the whole contract, including the
arbitration clause. However, English courts have moved away from
this position since 1942; they now extend the principle of separability
to the initial illegality of the contract. For example, in Heyman v Darwins
Ltd,87 the court held that if the general purpose of the contract fails, the
arbitration clause is not one of the purposes of the contract, hence, it
survives the contract.88 In sum, this article argues that, contrary to
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Approach to Arbitrability” (2013) 53 The Canadian Business Law Journal 178
(“… the approach in the United States is now one of strong arbitrability: it is
almost impossible to plead a claim of contractual infirmity that will be heard by
a court”).
89 The separability doctrine is important in international arbitration to be
circumscribed by issues of arbitrability. Indeed, Okanigbuan Jnr points out the
importance of separability doctrine when he notes that “[t]he application of
the [separability] doctrine checks the excesses of parties who may intend to
frustrate or delay the enforcement of the contract by a reference to national
courts that the contract embodying the agreement of the parties was void.” See
Francis Okanigbuan Jr (n 74) 259.
90 (Civil Appeal No 14 of 2011) [2011] UGCOMMC 97 (12 September 2011).
91 Scott v Avery (1856) 5 H L C 811.
92 The Judge noted: “I am of the opinion that this article [Article 14] of the PSA
also implied that any dispute relating to payment of those taxes would be
resolved in accordance with the laws of Uganda. This is because the mechanism
for tax dispute resolution in Uganda is explicit under the ITA and TAT Act”.
Idornigie and Onyema’s positions, the doctrine of separability should
not be circumscribed by arbitrability.89
4.2 Uganda
Similar to cases in Nigeria, the High Court of Uganda in Heritage Oil
and Gas Ltd v Uganda Revenue Authority,90 revoked an arbitration clause
in a Production Sharing Agreement because the container agreement
relates to tax matters. Article 14 of the PSA (container contract)
provides that: “[a]ll central, district, administrative, municipal and other
local administrators or other taxes, duties, levies or other lawful
impositions applicable to licensee shall be paid by the licensee in
accordance with the laws of Uganda in a timely fashion”. Article 26.1
of the PSA, which contains the arbitral clause, provides that: “[a]ny
dispute arising under the Agreement, which cannot be settled amicably
within sixty (60) days shall be referred to Arbitration in accordance
with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules…The Arbitration award shall be final
and binding on the Parties to this Agreement.” The High Court of Uganda
held that only the Uganda Revenue Agency (URA) can collect tax in
Uganda. Therefore, the container contract, together with the arbitration
agreement, is void because parties cannot contract out of a statute.
It is trite that an arbitral clause does not oust the jurisdiction of
courts, but it puts the rights of parties in abeyance, pending the
conclusion of arbitration proceedings.91 The court closed its eyes to
this principle; instead, it presumed against arbitration.92 In a manner
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93 At page 19.
94 Article 1 of the Revised UNCITRAL rules (2010) provides that “Where parties
have agreed that disputes between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, shall be referred to arbitration under
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, then such disputes shall be settled in
accordance with these Rules subject to such modification as the parties may
agree.” Article 23 provides that: “Arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule
on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or
validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause
that forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of
the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the
contract is null shall not entail automatically the invalidity of the arbitration
clause”.
95 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards
a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (Kluwer Law and Taxation 1981) 293. See
also Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd ed, Kluwer 2014) §
25.04[A], 3203 (“The default rule is very clearly the law of the arbitral seat,
not the law governing the parties’ underlying contract”).
that reflects a narrow nationalist policy approach, the court held that
since article 14 of the PSA imposes taxes on the licensee according to
the laws of Uganda, such matters are generally not arbitrable. The
rationale is that “[taxation] is the most reliable source of funds for
most developing economies and therefore subjecting it to the whims
and negotiation skills of contractors and Government Officials would
create uncertainty and inequity on the amounts payable and cause
economic instability”.93
The High Court missed the point in this case. Article 14 only imposed
duties on the licensee according to taxation laws in Uganda. It did not
subject the container contract to Ugandan law. In any event, the arbitral
clause, which is separable from the container contract, refers to the
resolution of disputes in accordance with the UNCITRAL Model Rules.
The combined provisions of Article 1 and 23 of the UNCITRAL Rules
mandate recourse to the arbitral tribunal to determine its own
jurisdiction.94 Moreover, there was an ongoing arbitral proceeding in
London. The choice of London as the seat of arbitration shows that the
parties intended that English law should apply. This is because “[i]f a
contract contains a general choice of law clause and provides in the
arbitral clause that arbitration is to be held in a country with a different
law, the latter indication must be deemed to prevail over the former”.95
The court neither considered the UNCITRAL Rules nor the law of
the seat of arbitration. It may be argued that even if the court had
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considered these issues, it would have struck down the arbitral
agreement because the agreement is against Uganda’s public policy.
However, this argument cannot be taken seriously because, as pointed
out above, the container contract subjects the licensee to the tax laws
in Uganda. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal will interpret duties and
obligation arising from the contract according to the taxation law in
Uganda. Even if the tribunal fails in its duty, the court’s supervisory
function is not foreclosed – it can review the award at the enforcement
stage for any breach of Uganda’s public policy. It may be safe to conclude
that the court was not comfortable with the ongoing arbitral proceedings
in London because of the tribunal’s perceived threat to Uganda’s
economy. Therefore, it looked for a way to halt the tribunal in its steps.
4.3 Ghana
Much like its neighbours in Nigeria and Uganda, the Ghanaian Supreme
Court, in Attorney-General v Balkan Energy LLC & Ors, decided a case
between a foreign energy company and the government of Ghana.96
The issue was whether the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) – the
contract that is the subject of arbitration – and the arbitral clause requires
Ghana’s parliamentary approval.97 Although Ghanaian law is that the
PPA is the governing law,98 the arbitral clause was to be governed by
the UNCITRAL Rules and the seat of arbitration was the Netherlands.99
Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court acknowledged that the arbitral
clause is a separate contract that does not require parliamentary
approval, it held that since an international commercial arbitration
draws its life from the container contract, the arbitral clause is not
separate and independent from the container contract.
96 Attorney-General v Balkan Energy LLC & Ors [2012] 2 SCGLR 998.
97 ibid. See section 181 (5) of the Ghanaian 1992 Constitution which stipulates
that all international business or economic transaction(s) to which the
Government is a party should be submitted to Parliament for approval.
98 Article 23 of the PPA provides that: “[t]his Agreement shall be governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Ghana”.
99 Article 22 of the PPA provides that “If any dispute arises out of or in relation to
this Agreement and if such matter cannot be settled through direct discussions
of the Parties, the matter shall be referred to binding arbitration at the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, Peace Palace, Carnegieplein 2, 2517 KJ in The Hague, The
Netherlands. . . . Applications may be made to such court for judicial recognition
of the award and/or an order of enforcement as the case may be. Arbitration
shall be governed by and conducted in accordance with UNCITRAL rules”.
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In effect, the court held that the container contract and arbitral
clause are inextricably linked, such that the fate of the former must
befall the latter.100 Indeed, this argument was advanced by one of the
experts retained by the Government of Ghana at the award’s
enforcement proceedings in the United States’ District Court of
Columbia.101 The District Court rejected the argument.102 It separated
the arbitration agreement from the container contract and held the
Ghanaian government liable. Expectedly, the Ghanaian government
also argued that the award was contrary to United States’ public policy
under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention because the PPA is
invalid under Ghanaian law. The District Court noted that although
the public policy defence is frequently raised, it is rarely successful.103
The Court, therefore, held that the public policy defence under Article
V(2)(b) is to be construed narrowly and is available only where an
arbitration award “tends clearly to undermine the public interest, the
public confidence in the administration of the law, or security for
individual rights of personal liberty or of private property”.104 Since the
100 For analysis of the shortcomings of this approach, see generally, Danika Balusik,
“Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Africa: An Analysis of the Regime
in South Africa and Ghana” (Lexology, 2 April 2019) <https://lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=e5501fd4-da44-40ac-be96-9320273097ed> accessed
on 22 April 2019.
101 Balkan Energy Limited, et Al v Republic of Ghana Case No. 17-cv-00584(APM)
delivered on 22 March 2018 < https://us-arbitration.shearman.com/siteFiles/
21504/2018.03.22%20BALKAN%20ENERGY%20LIMITED%20et%
20al%20v.%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20GHANA,%20No.%201_17-cv....pdf>
accessed on 18 August 2018.
102 It relied on Belize (n 24) to reach this conclusion. Belize has a similar case fact
to the present case. In Belize, the government of Belize argued that its former
prime minister lacked capacity to enter into the contract, and as a result, the
contract together with the arbitration clause, is void.  The District court held
that in order to invalidate the arbitral clause, the government of Belize must
show that the prime minister lacked capacity to enter into the arbitration
agreement itself.
103 At page 22. This is also true for most countries. See George Bermann (ed),
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The Interpretation and
Application of the New York Convention by National Courts, vol 23 (Springer
International 2017) 61. (“while the public policy defense may commonly be
invoked in national legal systems, it is seldom invoked successfully”).
104 Ibid. The public policy objection argument was also raised in Washington DC
Court of Appeal’s between Enron Nigeria Power Holding Ltd v Federal Republic
of Nigeria No. 1:13-cv-01106. The Nigerian government contended that the
award should be set aside because the contract was fraudulently induced,
therefore, contrary to public policy. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument
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Ghanaian government could not show any public interest, the defence
was unavailable. The District Court’s interpretation of public policy
and the doctrine of separability reflects the contemporary approach
that this article proposes.
An Overview of African Practice through Morgan’s
Theoretical Lens
The cases discussed in this article reflect a blurred distinction between
private rights and state interests in courts’ determination of arbitrability
in Africa. This article, grounded in Morgan’s theoretical framework of
contractual rights and state interest, opposes such a blurred
distinction.105 Morgan argues that in the determination of arbitrable
issues, courts must distinguish between those rights that naturally
flow from one person’s interaction with another and those that are
imposed by the state in furtherance of the collective interest.106 If the
cases examined in this article are subjected to Morgan’s theoretical
framework of analysis, it shows that some courts in Africa have trumped
state interest over personal autonomy because of their reluctance to
fully embrace the doctrines of party autonomy, separability, kompetenz-
kompetenz, which are the cornerstones of thriving arbitration practice.
Notwithstanding the foregoing criticism, this article does not argue
that there is no prospect for a thriving international arbitration practice
in African countries. Indeed, there are some decisions in Africa that
reflect global trends on arbitrability. For example, the Kenyan High
Court in Jatin Shantilal Malde & 9 others v Transmara Investment Limited
& 2 others107 suggests that if a constitutional interpretation is intertwined
with a private dispute, Kenyan Courts will lean towards resolving the
on the basis that that enforcement of the award is not so manifestly unjust that
its confirmation would “undermine . . . the public confidence in the
administration of the law”; similar arguments were made in Abuja International
Hotels v Meridian SAS [2012] Lloyd’s Rep but it was rejected under sections 67
and 68 of the United Kingdom Arbitration Act 1996. It should be noted that
these cases were decided under the United States and English law respectively.
They may be decided differently in Nigeria.
105 Edward Morgan, “Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to
the Arbitrability Question” (1987) 60 Southern California Law Review, p. 1059.
106 ibid 1075 (“claims premised on interpersonal impingement can readily be
removed from judicial administration, since the rights at stake in such disputes
can trace their roots to a conception of the parties’ autonomy”).
107 (Petition No 18) [2018] eKLR.
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private dispute without making pronouncements on the constitutional
issue, if the dispute can be resolved on the private issues alone.
Therefore, the arbitral jurisdiction is preserved because the court will
bifurcate public and private issues to grant a stay of court proceedings
pending arbitration.
5.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALIGNING WITH
GLOBAL BEST PRACTICES
As international contractors and consultants engage with the states,
state entities and domestic contracting firms (as sub-contractors) in
the ever-increasing market for major infrastructure projects in developing
countries, the need for an efficient framework for the effective resolution
of disputes from transnational commercial transactions has become
even more acute.108,109 Countries in Africa cannot rely on litigation to
resolve disputes arising from these relationships, hence, the resort to
arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution. However,
clutching to a nationalistic, protective and narrow interpretation of
public policy in relation to arbitrability will slow down the development
of arbitration practice in Africa. Indeed, Africa has its peculiar challenges
to arbitration. Adding restrictive interpretations will deepen these
challenges.110 Interpretational challenges relating to arbitrability in
international commercial transactions will make some African countries
unfriendly to arbitration. This is because “arbitrability has the potential
to affect the validity of an arbitration agreement, strip an arbitrator of
jurisdiction, or derail enforcement of an award”.111 As a result, Africa
may remain an unsuitable region for arbitration, even if its traditional
challenges are solved. Solutions must come from judicial and legislative
as well as regional efforts in Africa. I explain these heads in turn.
108 Saul Perloff, “Ties that Bind: The Limits of Autonomy and Uniformity in
International Commercial Arbitration” (1992) 13 University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Business Law 323.
109 Mante (n 11).
110 These challenges can be termed “Afro-centric” challenges. They include lack of
professional interaction, lack of diversity, proliferation of regional arbitration
centers, language and territorial Barriers, the African cultural context,
corruption and lack of experience. See Paul Ngotho, “Challenges Facing
Arbitrators in Africa” (East Africa International Arbitration Conference, Nairobi,
28 July 2014].
111 Mante (n 11) 1.
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5.1 The Judicial Task through a Proactive Approach
African countries must “catch-up” with their counterparts in other
regions through a narrow interpretation of public policy, loyalty to the
doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, and severability in international
commercial arbitration.112 A proactive judicial approach should be based
on current best practices and global trend, as this is a viable means to
reduce the influence of public policy on questions of arbitrability in
Africa.113 This is because “discovering the ‘actual prohibition of the law,’
which constitutes the public policy exception, is an interpretive and
judicial task”.114 Through a proactive judicial approach, the prospect of
a uniform interpretation of the Model Law and the New York Convention
may be enhanced.
This article does not recommend that courts in Africa copy judicial
interpretation wholesale from other regions. Neither does it advocate
for a total and uniform global interpretation. Rather, it argues that
courts in Africa must create their distinctive approach to uniform
interpretation on arbitrability that considers Africa’s historical, political
and economic past and the realism that modern best practices capture
in regard, particularly, to the socio-economic contexts for the application
of arbitration laws to international commercial disputes. In effect, this
article argues for substantial, and not total uniformity because it has
been noted that “in an ideal world, a uniform interpretation would be
desirable…[however]…an attempt to determine arbitrability through
[a] uniform interpretation of the New York Convention would be, in
practice, utopian”.115
112 See generally, Onyema (n 80); Ronan Feehily, “Separability in International
Commercial Arbitration; Confluence, Conflict and the Appropriate Limitations
in the Development and Application of the Doctrine” (2018) 34 International
Arbitration 355; Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, “Separability, Competence-Competence
and the Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction in Singapore” (1995) 7 Singapore Academy of
Law Journal 421; Ozlem Susler, “The English Approach to Competence-
Competence” (2013) 13 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 415;
Leonardo de Oliveira, “The English Law Approach to Arbitrability of Disputes”
(2016) 19 International Arbitration Law Review 155.
113 See for example, Andrew Tweedale, “Enforcing Arbitration Awards Contrary
to Public Policy in England” (2000) 17 The International Construction Law
Review 159.
114 Farshad Ghodoosi, “Arbitrating Public Policy: Why the Buck Should not Stop at
National Courts” (2016) 20 Lewis & Clark Law Review 237, 270.
115 Dorothee Schramm, Elliot Geisinger & Phillipe Pinsolle, “Article II” in Hebert
Kronke et al (eds), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A
Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer 2010) 37, 72.
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5.2 Legislative Reform
A common theme from the cases analysed in this article is the blurred
distinction between a container contract and an arbitration agreement.
This has led to a wide interpretation of the public policy to deny arbitral
jurisdictions, revoke arbitration clause, and refuse enforcement. If the
global trend of separating the container contract from the arbitration
agreement, together with recognition of the doctrine of kompetenz-
kompetenz is applied, public policy will assume a narrow interpretation,
as it is done in most jurisdictions today. This global trend is aptly
reflected in Article 23 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Rules which states
that:
[t]he Arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence
or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an
arbitration clause that forms part of a contract shall be treated as
an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A
decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null shall not
entail automatically the invalidity of the arbitration clause.
 If countries in Africa adopt this piece of legislation, it will enhance
the prospect of achieving a uniform interpretation of the UNCITRAL
Model Law.116 Although the Model Law is only a guide, it is hoped that
Article 23 will achieve convergence among African countries and other
jurisdictions around the World. South Africa’s recent adoption of the
Model Law signifies a welcoming development in this regard. However,
even if adopted,117 the Model law must be supported by progressive
judicial interpretation because “even where there is a good law, a judge
can make a hell out of it”.118 In effect, parties will be comfortable to
choose an African jurisdiction as the seat of arbitration if they are sure
that African countries would apply globalized principles of arbitration,
116 See María Pilar Perales Viscasillas, “Is a Uniform Arbitrability Needed at an
International Level?” (Kluwer International, 5 January 2016) <http://
kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/01/05/is-a-uniform-arbitrability-rule-
needed-at-an-international-level/ > accessed on 18 August 2018. See also
Gerold Herrman, “UNCITRAL Arbitration Law: A Good Model of a Model Law”
(1998) 3 Uniform Law Review 483, 490. Herrmann argues that adopting the
UNCITRAL Model has a public relations effect.
117 As Nigeria has done with its Arbitration and Conciliation Act (n 60).
118 Alatise Taofeek, (72) 241.
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which include arbitrability.119 Some speakers at the Second International
Chamber of Commerce Conference held in Kenya, 5 June 2017, on
“The Future of Arbitration in Africa: Accommodating Economic Growth
and Concomitant Challenges”,120 recommend that Africa needs a change
in culture. Africa needs a change both in law and culture regarding
what is arbitrable and how to construe it.
5.3 Regional Institutional Integration
The growing arbitration institutions in Africa may achieve global
legislative convergence.121 For example, the revised Organization for
the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) Uniform Act on
arbitration and revised Rules of the Joint Court of Justice and Arbitration
Act, which entered into force on 15 March 2018, is a step in this
direction. The instrument, which is in line with UNCITRAL Model Law
and international best practices, binds 17 member states of OHADA.122
Although the domestic interpretation of laws among OHADA member
states is outside the scope of this article, the OHADA framework may
provide a supranational legal blueprint for African countries, particularly
the conventional common law jurisdictions.
6.  CONCLUSION
This article discussed the amorphous nature of public policy and its
influence on matters that are arbitrable. It particularly examined courts’
119 See for example Alexander Brabant and Ophélie Divoy, “The Enforcement of
International Arbitral Awards in OHADA Member States – The Uniform Act on
Arbitration is Not the Smooth Ride it was Designed to Be” (2016)13 TDM –
Special Edition 1.
120 See the speakers<https://iccwbo.org/event/future-arbitration-africa-
accommodating-economic-growth-concomitant-challenges/> accessed on 18
August 2018.
121 Roland Ziade & Clement Fouchard, “New OHADA Arbitration Text Enters into
Force” (Kluwer International, 30 March 2018) <http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2018/03/30/new-ohada-arbitration-text-enters-into-
force/> accessed on 17 April 2019.
122 Michael Ostrove, Ben Sanderson & Andrea Lapunzina Veronelli, “Developments
in African Arbitration” (The Middle Eastern and African Arbitration Review,
10 May 2018)< https://globalarbitrationreview.com/benchmarking/the-
middle-eastern-and-afr ican-arbi trat ion-review-2018/1169293/
developments-in-african-arbitration> accessed on 10 April 2019.
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difficulty to distinguish between those rights that naturally flow from
one person’s interaction with another and those that are imposed by
the state in furtherance of the collective interest. Through an analysis
of selected case studies, it concludes that most countries – especially
developed ones – have limited the influence of public policy in the
determination of disputes that would be subject to arbitration. However,
some courts in African states still take a nationalistic protective
approach to public policy influence on arbitrability – they hold that
private relationships touching sovereign economic interest, no matter
how minute, are non-arbitrable.
Adopting this approach is not in the best economic interest of
developing countries because parties from developed countries will
not choose an arbitral seat that restricts the scope of arbitrability, nor
will they be willing to enter into contracts with parties in these
countries. A change in approach must be made to reflect the emergent
global practice of restricting the scope of public policy. For Africa, judicial
activism, legislative innovation, and regional institutional integration
are the ways to utilize to effect this change. Among them, judicial
activism is the most potent tool for this purpose because the judges
not only interpret existing law and doctrine. As well, they can be forceful
in the push for legislative and policy change. It must not be forgotten
that ultimately, it is Africa’s socio-economic and legal development
which hang on this change.
